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It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. 
The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.1 
 
 For several decades, civil libertarians on the bench, at the bar, and in the academy 
have argued that privacy – whether as a constitutional or statutory right or as protected by 
the common law – should be understood as two separate concepts:  freedom from 
intrusion and protection for autonomy.  As many have observed, they are not unrelated:  
both are about limiting exertions of government or institutional power for the sake of 
protecting the boundary between the self and society and, ultimately, the vitality of both.  
The relationship between privacy and autonomy is quite plain in the workplace.  We 
experience some workplace rules that deny privacy or autonomy as invasions of the self.  
Perhaps nowhere is the invasion more keenly felt than when an employer demands, under 
penalty of forfeiting one’s livelihood, that one dress or alter one’s physical appearance in 
a way that one finds offensive, degrading, inappropriate, or alien.   
Clothes and appearance are constitutive of how we see and feel about ourselves 
and how we construct ourselves for the rest of the world to see.  Most people give careful 
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 thought to how they dress as a part of defining who they are.  We dress to establish an 
identity and to fit in with some subculture while rejecting others.  (Green hair or brown? 
Dreads or straighteners? Make-up or none?  Brooks Brothers suits or Tshirts and jeans?  
Miniskirt and stilettos or jeans and Birkenstocks?)  Dressing does more than “fit[] the 
dresser into one of the available, intelligible categories of people,” it is “performative in 
the sense that it does something in the world, rather than just representing an ‘interior.’”2  
That is, people create culture through their actions, including dress.  Even those who 
profess to attend little to their appearance make disregard of appearance part of their 
definition of self; they see themselves as free of vanity and superficiality, and they 
participate in the creation of a subculture that rejects obvious attention to appearance.   
Dress not only defines us, it affects how we feel on a daily basis.  People who like 
to dress up often say it makes them feel more handsome, dignified, and powerful.  People 
who loathe dressing up say it makes them feel bound up, stilted, and oppressed.  
Conventions of appearance for women and men, and for racial, ethnic, and religious 
groups express and observe political and spiritual commitments that affect people at a 
deep psychological level.  Anyone who thinks that appearance regulation is trivial just 
isn’t thinking hard enough.3 
In this essay, I argue that the legal framework of autonomy privacy is a necessary 
supplement to the discrimination analysis that has dominated legal thinking for thirty-five 
years of challenges to workplace appearance requirements.4  Appearance is an important 
                                                 
2 DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, ETC. 186 (1993). 
3 People do sometimes insist that dress codes are too trivial to be worthy either of legal regulation or of 
much attention at all.  Examples from judicial opinions are collected and the assertion is debunked in 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes:  Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, 
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4 I am not the first to see the values of privacy as well as equality at state in legal protection for some 
degree of freedom of dress in the workplace.  See Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American 
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 aspect of the way we perform our racial, gender and other identities, dress codes often 
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age or 
disability, and when they do they should be illegal.5  Nevertheless, I believe it is 
important to recognize that some appearance requirements should be legally suspect even 
when they do not discriminate on the basis of a protected status.  On that basis I will 
argue for a fundamental re-examination of the legal regulation of workplace appearance 
codes.  While the re-examination may be fundamental, the permissibility of many 
appearance codes would not necessarily change radically:  some will be illegal, many will 
be legal.  I argue for a change of emphasis rather than a revolution in outcomes.   
A privacy analysis, in contrast to a discrimination analysis, is a legal theory that is 
available to anyone who is significantly oppressed by an unreasonable workplace dress 
code.   Privacy analysis may thus be more resistant to charges of special treatment and 
the backlash that such charges can generate.6  From the employer’s standpoint, privacy 
analysis allows more flexibility and nuance in distinguishing appearance regulations that 
are legal from those that are not.  It might, for example, preserve the ability of an 
employer to require some dress conventions, including some that may reflect gender, 
religious, and other norms, while ruling out others.  A law firm might be able to require 
coats and ties for men but not skirts for women, even though both are explicitly gender-
                                                                                                                                                 
Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 251-53 (1996); Annabelle Lever, What’s Wrong with that 
Beard?  Privacy and Equality in the Workplace:  The Struggle Over Dress and Grooming Codes 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).  Nevertheless, as the citations infra in note __ suggest, the 
dominant legal analysis of workplace grooming requirements has been through the lens of 
antidiscrimination rather than privacy. 
5 On workplace discrimination and the performance of racial identity, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu 
Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000). 
6 Arguing that an approach to rights that benefits all, rather than is perceived as special treatment for some, 
see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy:  Rethinking 
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Privacy 5   3 3/24/2006 
 based and neither is a bona fide occupational qualification, because a court might 
conclude that the autonomy infringement might be greater for the women and the 
justification for appealing to the preferences of the employer or customers for men to 
look professional is greater than for women to look sexy.  A privacy analysis would help 
courts distinguish between dress codes that humiliate and those that do not, as well as 
help a court understand that a dress code can be generally valid but cannot be enforced 
against a particular employee who might find a particular dress requirement exceptionally 
humiliating or offensive.   
Wholly apart from the effects of a privacy analysis on the outcome of litigation, I 
think it will also prompt a more thoughtful analysis by firms of whether or how they 
should attempt formally to regulate employee appearance and how to handle the 
employee who objects.  Employment law should attend not only to how rules would be 
applied in litigation but also, perhaps even most importantly, to how rules affect 
voluntary compliance.7  A privacy analysis will prompt an employer to consider the 
strength of its justification for its policy, the degree of humiliation it will affect on 
particular workers, and whether the harm is necessary to achieve the benefit.  A 
discrimination analysis, by contrast, invites an employer to adopt even a silly appearance 
regulation (e.g., women must wear make-up and nail polish) if the employer can convince 
itself that the regulation is not sex discrimination because it equally burdens men or 
because only certain women will object.  Privacy analysis will thus better identify and 
                                                 
7 One could argue, for example, that the major achievement of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. 12101, et seq. is not reflected in the results of litigation, where plaintiffs lose overwhelmingly and 
where the law has been steadily narrowed by judicial interpretation, see, e.g., Ruth Colker, Winning and 
Losing Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001), but through voluntary 
compliance that changed employer assumptions about what they can and should do with disabled 
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 accommodate the employer’s interest in the appearance of its workforce with interests of 
various employees in being free from humiliating workplace requirements. 
 
I. Dress Codes, Status and Power 
 
A few months ago, I received a request for legal advice from an employee of a 
school that had recently instituted a dress code for all staff.  The new rules required male 
staff to wear khaki slacks and a collared shirt.  The man, an electrician who often worked 
outdoors and in un-air-conditioned spaces, said he could not wear light colored clothes 
because he has a physical condition that causes him to perspire profusely.  As he 
explained it, “If I have to wear khaki pants, inside of an hour I’ll look like I wet myself.  
The students will laugh, and I’m just not willing to be humiliated.”  I suggested that he 
get medical documentation of his condition and ask his employer to make an exception to 
allow him to wear dark-colored clothes.  The man called me back a week later and said 
that his employer refused to make an exception.  I thought about suggesting litigation 
except I couldn’t find a legal theory – his perspiration condition is probably not a 
disability (because excessive perspiring probably does not interfere with a major life 
activity8); firing him wasn’t a breach of contract (he was an at will employee); it was hard 
to identify a public policy that was offended by a khaki pants uniform; and the dress code 
was not adopted or maintained for the purpose of intentionally inflicting emotional 
distress.  The man decided to resign rather than to be humiliated by complying with the 
dress code or by having a confrontation over refusing to comply.   
                                                 
8 The Americans with Disabilities Act defines a disability as a “physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.”  42 U.S.C. 12102 (2)(A). 
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 I was at first stunned that the school district would reject what I considered such a 
minor and reasonable request and would let a long-term employee go over it.  But when I 
thought about it, I realized that the school officials interpreted his request for an 
exemption as a major challenge to their authority.  And, as I thought about why they 
thought so much was at stake over khaki as opposed to black chino pants, I realized why 
this wasn’t trivial to them.  If they made an exception for one employee, they must have 
feared being inundated with requests for exceptions for employees who didn’t want to 
buy a new wardrobe.  They may have worried that other employees would suspect 
favoritism as they wondered why he was treated differently.  From the employer’s 
perspective, allowing one employee an alternative to the dress code, even a dress code as 
arbitrary (but as conventional) as one that required khaki-colored pants instead of dark-
colored ones, would risk not only the dress code but also the employer’s reputation for 
even-handedness.  An employer that announces a mandatory dress code and then cannot 
enforce it loses control over the workplace in a way that it would perceive as quite 
serious.  It would upset the power structure.  Soon, the school officials might have feared, 
they would lose control over their “right” (or at least their ability) to demand that 
employees dress professionally and model appropriate behavior for students.  Needless to 
say, schools are acutely aware of the importance of maintaining discipline.  From my 
own grim memories of the barely controlled chaos in my junior high, I’m not entirely 
unsympathetic to the general sentiment, much as I thought the employer’s desire to win 
this particular power struggle was silly and misguided.   
The experience of the man who could not wear khaki pants also offers perspective 
on why the matter of dress codes ought not be left to the negotiations of employer and 
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 employee.  The very definition of a dress code is one that must be applied to all 
employees of a certain category.  A khaki pants requirement is probably unobjectionable 
to many, and thus I imagine it would rather difficult for the man I spoke with to persuade 
his co-workers to join his cause.  If they were going to stand up and fight over working 
conditions, I suspect they’d rather fight for a longer lunch break or higher pay or a better 
student-teacher ratio.  So my guy had no effective voice, his only “choice” was to quit.  
That is the plight faced by any minority – a Sikh who wishes to wear a turban, a woman 
who really detests make-up.  Protecting the minority from having to choose between a 
job and something really important is what employment law is all about. 
Another window on the importance of power and autonomy, as well as gender 
conformity, in workplace appearance regulation is Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
Company, which is the case of Darlene Jespersen, who had been a bartender in the sports 
bar at Harrah’s casino in Reno for many years until she was fired after refusing accept the 
casino’s new requirement that women wear make-up and nail polish.9  She had not worn 
make-up to work for years and Harrah’s had tolerated it.  Moreover, what actually 
prompted the firing was not that Jespersen came to work one day without make-up, but 
rather that her supervisor provoked a show-down over Jespersen’s refusal to sign a 
statement promising to comply with the new appearance policy.  The policy, which 
Harrah’s called a “Personal Best Program,” was adopted as part of a “Beverage 
Department Image Transformation.”   Harrah’s hired a make-up expert to give each 
employee a make-over and then had a photographer take a post-make-over photograph of 
                                                 
9 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1065 (2005).  I rely on Devon Carbado, 
Mitu Gulati, and Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story:  Makeup and Women at Work, in JOEL W. 
FRIEDMAN, ED., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES (2006) for the facts in this paragraph; all 
quotations are to their chapter. 
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 each employee.  Harrah’s instructed supervisors to use the photograph as an “appearance 
measurement tool”: that is, the supervisor was empowered and encouraged to compare an 
employee to his or her photograph on a daily basis to see whether he or she measured up.  
The appearance code required females to wear specific types of make-up:  foundation, 
blush, mascara, and lipstick.  Other requirements included “teased, curled, or styled” hair 
and colored nail polish.  She was fired because she challenged the power of the company 
to change her appearance.  Although much of the writing on Jespersen has focused on 
gender conformity, I think that power and humiliation are as important to understanding 
the case as is gender.  I imagine that a number of women who have no objection to 
wearing make-up might have been offended by and rebelled against the intrusiveness and 
demeaning nature of the Harrah’s policy.   
Because Title VII offered the only available claim, Jespersen’s lawyers had very 
good strategic reasons to play up the gender identity issue and to play down the power 
struggle, but in doing so they had to omit a crucial part of the story.  Part of what 
Harrah’s was trying to do to Jespersen was to feminize and sexualize her, but part of it 
was simply trying to control her.  Put another way, if I were in her situation I’d be 
offended by the “Personal Best” requirement even though I personally have no objection 
to styling my hair and wearing make-up.  The Harrah’s policy should be illegal not only 
because or to the extent that it forces women to perform a particular version of a feminine 
gender identity, it should be illegal even if every female Harrah’s employee is 
comfortable with a version of femininity that involves wearing make-up and nail polish, 
simply because it removes their autonomy to choose.   Considering the case only through 
the lens of sex discrimination ignores the concerns of all employees, male and female, 
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 who find unnecessarily demeaning the use of the “Personal Best” photograph as a 
measurement device, and the notion that your supervisor is empowered to scrutinize the 
minute details of your appearance on a daily basis, comparing you to a photograph, and 
reprimanding you if on a particular day your supervisor decides you just don’t look 
enough like an idealized image of yourself all done up. 
Another perspective on the importance of power and humiliation in appearance 
regulation is offered by the cases involving people who are disciplined for covering their 
heads according to the dictates of their religion.  It is not hard to see that a dress code that 
prohibits turbans, yarmulkes, or headscarves disparately affects certain religions.  But 
many people believe that the discrimination should be permissible because people ought 
to assimilate culturally.  The skepticism about these claims often comes from a notion 
that law should not require employers to accommodate unconventional habits of dress 
regardless of an employee’s reason for choosing them.  If the Air Force can prohibit all 
people from wearing hats indoors or at night, why should a Jew get a special exception?10  
A privacy analysis helps us see why the Air Force’s requirement really does harm a 
Jewish man or a Sikh in a profound sense that is not captured simply by thinking about 
when or whether people should be treated equally or differently.  Privacy refocuses our 
attention away from whether Jews get a special exception from an appearance 
requirement that many may find reasonable and toward the ways in which some 
applications of appearance requirements that are at most annoying or silly to some and 
would to others be so offensive that he would rather be discharged or quit rather than 
comply. 
                                                 
10 The Supreme Court held that a Jewish officer was not entitled to an exemption from the no-hats rule in 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
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 From perspective of power and humiliation that privacy analysis invites us to 
consider, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins might read quite differently than it customarily 
is.11  Ann Hopkins, a candidate for partnership in the Price Waterhouse accounting firm, 
was passed over for partnership and was advised that her chances for reconsideration 
would improve if she wore make-up, styled her hair, and wore jewelry.  The Court held 
that Hopkins was a victim of illegal sex stereotyping.12  Of course it is a case about 
discrimination.  But the use of Ann Hopkins’ appearance as a reason to deny her 
partnership both reflects and exacerbates her humiliating lack of status in the workplace 
as well as the stereotyping that kept her from being perceived as successful.  Most people 
would probably encourage women and men at an accounting firm to dress 
conventionally, which might include not looking too butch or too feminine (in the case of 
women), or too ethnic (in the case of racial or ethnic minorities) or too sloppy or 
unprofessional (in the case of white men).  Price Waterhouse partners might say, in their 
own defense:  “Look, there’s an appearance code here for everybody, and a man who 
regularly failed to dress conventionally for work – by showing up without a tie or in 
sweatpants or unshaven – would also not be welcomed into the partnership either, so 
we’re not discriminating.  It’s just that somebody came out and said it to her.”  But what 
you see reading between the lines of the decision is that men who broke norms of 
appearance were probably quietly reminded to spiff up a bit, whereas Ann Hopkins was 
called on the carpet (and fired).  The firm breached the norm that appearance codes are 
not spelled out in detail and enforced by adverse job action against professionals.  The 
firm underscored Hopkins’ humiliating lack of status by acting like the headmistress of 
                                                 
11 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
12 Id. at 235. 
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 my parochial high school who used to feel entitled to remark on which girls wore their 
uniform skirts too short and who needed to polish her saddle shoes.  In short, appearance 
codes are about power as well as about stereotyping, and I think we miss much of the 
nuance when we focus only on one element.   
Let me now move from the particularity of these four cases to a general 
theoretical framework for considering workplace appearance regulation.  Most accounts 
of dress codes in legal scholarship have focused on the ways that they enable both 
employers and employees to do what economists refer to as “screening” and 
“signaling.”13  Screening is the information economics term for devices that people use to 
filter out the desirable from the undesirable in the market.  Signaling refers to the way 
that buyers and sellers in a market reveal valuable but nonobvious information about 
themselves.  In the conventional account, dress is a way of signaling certain qualities 
(professionalism, religious devotion, attitudes toward sex) and dress regulation is a way 
that employers use these signals both to screen potential employees for certain traits and 
to enable customers or other potential trading partners to screen out some business 
establishments in favor of others when they seek a good or service in the marketplace.14  I 
do not disagree that dress codes perform these functions.   I want to suggest, however, 
that appearance codes play other roles as well.   
                                                 
13 The literature discussing appearance requirements is voluminous.  Among the leading or recent articles 
are Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 167, 168 (2004); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining 
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004); Robert Post, Predudicial Appearances: The 
Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000); Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating 
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 
YALE  L.J. 1  (1995); Katharine Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, 
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2553-55 (1994); Karl E. Klare, 
Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1428 (1992); Mary 
Wisner, Gender Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73, 74 (1982). 
14 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note __. 
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 Sociologists, anthropologists, and high-school kids know that appearance is a 
mark of status, or, more accurately, what sociologist Erving Goffman called “social 
identity”:  the mix of personal and social attributes through which every society 
categorizes people.15  As Goffman long ago observed, “first appearances are likely to 
enable us to anticipate [a stranger’s] category and attributes,” and we use our 
expectations based on appearances to make quick judgments about people.  “We lean on 
these anticipations we have, transforming them into normative expectations, into 
righteously presented demands.”16 A supervisor might think is he demanding adherence 
to certain norms of appearance because the expected method of dress connotes a higher 
or distinct status (as when a firm or a court demands that men wear suits and ties).  When 
an employee refuses to accede to conventions of dress in a particular workplace, 
however, she asserts her status as being beyond the power of the employer to demand 
conformity.  When an employer insists upon conformity, the struggle quickly becomes as 
much about maintaining discipline and controlling deviance as it is about enforcing 
particular norms of race, gender, or religion.  Thus, although a mode of dress chosen, 
even under the influence of social norms, can be a marker of an individual’s status, the 
same mode of dress explicitly compelled becomes a marker of the employer’s higher 
status and the employee’s subordination.  In this analysis, we see that appearance codes 
do more than screen and signal, they are a battleground of social power.  
To see why, consider some examples that have recently been in the news.  When 
David Stern, the commissioner of the NBA, recently announced that professional 
basketball players should dress like businessmen rather than like rappers when appearing 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:  NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). 
16 Id. at 2. 
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 in public,17 and when George Steinbrenner made Johnny Damon cut his hair as a 
condition of signing him to the Yankees,18 the heart of the offense (if there is an offense) 
is not that the NBA and the Yankees are discriminating on the basis of race or gender; the 
offense (if there is one) is that they are trying to make players project an image that some 
players don’t want to project.  There may be, especially in the case of the NBA, an aspect 
of the dispute that is about discrimination in the way that people perform racial or gender 
identity, but there is in my view a larger sense in which the disputes aren’t about 
discrimination, they are about the power to project an image.   
In the case of the NBA players, one could argue that the chosen attire of the 
players connotes some aspect of urban black subculture, but it takes a bit of essentializing 
to argue that business dress is somehow “white.”  Moreover, some of the attire that the 
NBA sought to eradicate in public appearances is less “black” than it is urban counter-
cultural, as some young men of all races dress that way.  Many supporters and some 
critics of the NBA dress code were uncomfortable saying that the problem was its effort 
to make players look less “black” because it says that professional dress is “white.”  To 
me, what is at least as important as whether the appearance code is racial stereotyping is 
that it is an effort to control how the players express themselves through their dress.  The 
NBA is big business for big business.  NBA players, when they’re not entertaining 
                                                 
17 The NBA dress code for off-court wear requires players to wear “business or conservative attire” 
(collared shirts, closed-toe shoes, sport coats, and no ostentatious jewelry) while traveling, on the bench 
during a game and not in uniform, making official appearances, or conducting league business.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NBA_dress_code.  All seem to agree that the purpose of the code was to avoid 
players’ appearance evoking “hip hop culture,” or what one newspaper columnist characterized as players 
“looking like recruiting officers for the Crips and the Bloods.”  Frank Deford, Suiting Up:  NBA Dress 
Code Draws Criticism from Many Corners, Sports Illustrated, Oct 26, 2005, available at 
www.sportsillustrated.cnn.com (quoting Phil Muchnick of The New York Post). The NBA also recently has 
begun enforcing a rule regulating players’ on-court wear, requiring shorts to be one inch above the knee, 
again for the same stated purpose:  to avoid players looking too hip-hop.  See Selena Roberts, NBA Dress 
Code Confuses the Long and Short of It, NY TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005.  
18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beard#Sport (“Under owner George Steinbrenner, the New York Yankees 
baseball team has a strict dress code that forbids long hair and facial hair below the lip.”) 
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 business people watching a game from their luxury boxes, are often touted as role models 
for kids; they promote reading, hard work, etc.  Neither role is consistent, at least in the 
eyes of some NBA officials, with looking like rebellious teens because the image 
connoted by certain clothing is not “blackness,” it is (to some people’s view) criminality 
and a lack of respect for education.  So the NBA insisted that the players project a 
conventional business image rather than an urban renegade subculture image.  What 
bothers me is not the racial connotations of the dress code but that it puts the NBA in the 
role of a judgmental parent (“You’re not going out of the house dressed like that”) and 
the players in the position of recalcitrant teens.  
Damon’s hair is an even better case for re-considering dress codes as autonomy 
infringements rather than status discrimination.  Damon’s long hair and beard may have 
been flamboyant and unconventional, but it wasn’t a marker of a protected status (people 
said it made him look like Jesus, but no one claims that Steinbrenner was discriminating 
against Christians in requiring short hair and no beards).19  It had become a marker of his 
status as a marquee player, as someone so recognizable that he could be easily spotted 
even by those ignorant about baseball when he played himself in a movie.20  Insisting on 
adherence to the dress code says to the world, “you’re my player now and I can make you 
wear your hair in any way I please.”  That professional athletes are fantastically well 
compensated does not make the regulation of their appearance any less an infringement 
on their autonomy; it only means that they are paid well for enduring it. 
                                                 
19 See http://www.boston.com/sports/baseball/redsox/articles/2004/02/26/hairs_johnny_damon_shocks 
(“heads turned as Damon, fully bearded, with his brown hair flowing to his shoulders, submitted one of the 
best impersonations of Jesus of Nazareth this side of “The Passion of the Christ.”) 
 
 
20 Damon’s distinctive appearance helped to make him a minor character in the film about the Boston Red 
Sox’ World Series winning season, Fever Pitch.   
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 Finally, to see why the appearance regulations sought to be imposed on these 
athletes was as much about power as about discrimination, consider the circumstances in 
which an employer feels empowered to articulate and enforce an explicit dress code.  
Dress codes are usually defended by reference to the employer’s “right” or “power” to 
present the corporate image of its choice.  As professor of consumer behavior put it, “to 
have somebody really out of context destroys the illusion” that a company chooses to 
create for its public.21  But many firms either don’t explicitly articulate a dress code or 
don’t enforce it because to do so would be contrary to the norms of the occupation or the 
firm.  Most universities, for example, do not maintain dress codes for faculty.  High 
status jobs are more likely to leave dress codes quite vague (“business attire” or “casual 
Fridays”) and not to call nonconformists onto the carpet in an explicit way. 
When the norms of appearance autonomy are violated in high status jobs, the 
offense cannot be captured solely through the rubric of unequal treatment.  If the dean of 
my law school came to my office to ask me to dress more formally to teach, the offense 
would not be sex discrimination, even if business clothes are different for men and 
women (unless of course she confronted only women and allowed men to dress casually).  
The offense to me would be the dean asserting the power to tell me what image I am to 
project.  Though I never wear jeans to teach, my immediate instinct would be to wear 
nothing but jeans so long as the dean insisted on the power to tell me otherwise.  The fact 
that most law school deans would not dream of telling faculty how to dress, even if some 
probably wish that some faculty dressed more formally, reveals the fundamental 
significance of power and humiliation in workplace dress codes.  They realize they don’t 
                                                 
21 Kara Jesella, Beauty Bullies, N.Y. TIMES STYLE MAGAZINE Spring 2006 at 130 (quoting Michael 
Solomon of Auburn University). 
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 have the power to control that aspect of law professors’ behavior, and they have no desire 
to risk their own dignity by treading on that aspect of status.  Employers of high-status 
employees rarely attempt to assert the power to request employees project a certain image 
because they risk losing power rather than gaining it in the confrontation.  As noted 
above, the transgression of the unspoken rule that dress codes remain largely unspoken is 
one of the appalling features of Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse. 
There is a world of difference in choosing to wear something and being forced to 
wear it.  Choosing to wear something is to experience the power to present a self to the 
world, even if the choice is heavily constrained by social forces and reflects only a 
decision to blend in by wearing something you would never otherwise choose to wear.  
(Why would men choose to wear a piece of colored silk knotted tightly around their 
necks except that it is conventional and in our culture connotes professionalism, elegance, 
and respect for tradition?)  Being told you’ll be fired unless you attend a business 
meeting on Wall Street wearing a pin-striped suit has a whole different connotation than 
reluctantly choosing to wear one because you know you’ll raise eyebrows if you don’t.  
Elite workplaces don’t bother with formal dress codes except at the most general level (Is 
there a casual Friday? Do men wear ties? Do women wear dresses or suits?).  That is 
because power operates quite differently at that status level.   
It is important to understand that context is everything in thinking about whether 
and when dress codes humiliate.  When police forces and railroads sought to introduce 
uniforms in mid-mineteenth century America, their efforts were met with derision and 
resistance by workers who considered uniforms “degrading in a democratic society” and 
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 appropriate only for “liveried servants” not “free Americans.”22  Today, of course, most 
people see nothing degrading about requiring police officers to wear uniforms.  Not every 
dress code is an effort to induce conformity for the sake of conformity, or to assert power.  
The requirement that employees wear costumes is sometimes about setting a mood (a 
symphony orchestra) or playing a role (as in Disneyland) and it is sometimes about 
making employees easily identifiable and distinguishable from others (as in the case of 
police, soldiers, hospital employees, and flight attendants).  And there may be 
circumstances in which minute attention to the smallest aspects of personal appearance is 
not demeaning because appearance is so integral to the job (as in the case of actors and 
fashion models).  Appearance requirements, even when they are gendered or racial, in 
these circumstances connote an entirely different power dynamic than do appearance 
requirements enforced against athletes or bartenders.  The reason has something to do 
with the tradition of respect for military and police uniforms, and something to do with 
the widespread recognition that conventions of dress are at the core rather than the 
periphery of some jobs (playing Snow White for a crowd of children at Disneyland).   
There are plenty of cases on the margins, however.  Are employees who work in 
office jobs the fashion industry fair game for unabashed supervisory demands as to their 
appearance?  A recent article in the style supplement to The New York Times Magazine 
argues not, characterizing as “beauty bullies” supervisors “who demand that their staff 
look a certain way and aren’t shy about saying so.”23  Even if you work in an industry 
                                                 
22 Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 252 
(1996), quoting WALTER LICHT, WORKING FOR THE RAILROAD:  THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 271 (1983), and DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER:  THE EXPERIENCE OF 
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 67 (1993). 
23 Kara Jesella, Beauty Bullies, NY TIMES STYLE MAGAZINE, Spring 2006 at 130 (“the stories are legion:  
the beauty executive who fired a junior staffer who refused to get Japanese hair straightening; the male 
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 that sells beauty, when a publicist says to a subordinate that she needs to dye her hair, 
pluck her eyebrows, or get a pedicure, the demands can be interpreted not as creating a 
corporate image but as humiliating a young subordinate.  The necessity and the cultural 
context make some uniforms and appearance requirements a source of fun or pride and 
others humiliating.   
Even when an appearance requirement is generally unobjectionable from the 
standpoint of individual freedom, however, there may be applications of the uniform 
requirement that are really about power and humiliation.  Antidiscrimination law has 
traditionally focused on requiring the same treatment of all or different treatment for 
some, and has had a notoriously difficult time distinguishing when justice is better served 
by a model of equality or one of difference.24  (Think of the long controversy over 
pregnancy discrimination, religious and disability accommodation, and affirmative 
action.)  When it comes to appearance requirements, one can see that sometimes equal 
treatment is humiliating and sometimes different treatment is.  When the Citadel 
proposed to force its first female cadet to shave her head like the male cadets, all saw that 
equal treatment was a way to humiliate a woman whom it believed did not belong in a 
male institution by forcing her to look like a man to the point of ridicule.25  A bank’s rule 
that women had to wear uniforms while men did not was properly seen to be humiliating 
                                                                                                                                                 
editor in chief who explicitly forbade his female employees to wear makeup (which is nothing compared 
with the famously soignée editrix who insists that prospective hires include Polaroids along with their 
resumes)”). 
24 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001); 
Samuel Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil 
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003). 
25 See Bartlett, supra note __ at 2571-72 & n.146 (“Ironically, the ritual of scalp shaving in the military-
school context is to humiliate and to provide a basis for group bonding.  When applied to the only woman 
in an otherwise all-male environment, however, there should be little doubt that the effect is to set apart the 
female for whom a bald head means something quite different than for men”). 
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 to women26; conversely, if a police department required men but not women to wear 
uniforms, most would see that, again, women would be humiliated.  The Air Force’s 
refusal to treat an Orthodox Jew differently – prohibiting him from wearing a kepah 
because head coverings are not worn indoors or at night -- was humiliating because it 
signified that the Air Force has the power to dictate rules that deny religious expression.27  
What helps us distinguish humiliation and dignity in equal treatment and different 
treatment is attention to the ways that controlling dress is an exercise of power. 
The focus on screening or signaling which dominate antidiscrimination analysis 
trains our attention on whether it is acceptable for the employer generally, in the name of 
signaling professionalism for example, to expect that men dress conventionally, or 
whether it is acceptable for employers to screen employees by employing only those who 
adhere to widely-accepted societal norms, as by not exposing tattoos.28   Both of these 
focuses make appearance codes seem trivial.  A privacy analysis with its attention to 
coercion and humiliation, by contrast, reminds us of why appearances matter and helps us 
identify the situations in which equality should be required and when difference should 
be required.  Privacy doctrine alerts us to the exercise of power and to the question 
whether an exercise of power is really offensive to freedom and when it is justified by 
some overwhelming need.   
 
II. Privacy as Autonomy 
 
                                                 
26 Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1989). 
27 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that Jewish officer did not have first amendment 
right to wear yarmulke in contravention of Air Force regulation prohibiting the wearing of headgear 
indoors). 
28 See Brandy Dela Vega, Tattoos in Business:  OK or Taboo? RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Mar. 5, 2006. 
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 At its origins, the invasion of privacy tort was like the tort of outrage (now known 
as intentional infliction of emotional distress) in its emphasis on humiliation.29  Like 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, privacy focuses on how some behaviors 
assault a person’s autonomy by affronting their dignity or psyche, just as other torts such 
as assault or battery, injure by invading autonomy through threats or actual physical 
touching.  Privacy was seen as a tort doctrine that would protect the individual against the 
harms of abuses of power in society.  
In the years since invasion of privacy was first regarded as being a legal wrong, 
the protections for privacy have spread through tort law, constitutional law, and statutes.  
Different states define a right to workplace privacy in different ways, and protect it under 
a variety of doctrines, including statutes, the various permutations of the privacy tort 
recognized by the Restatement of Torts, a public policy claim, a constitutional claim (for 
public sector employees and, even in private employment in California, where the 
constitutional right of privacy does not have a state action requirement30), the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing (in Alaska),31 and in cases of extremely offensive policies like 
strip searches, the intentional infliction of emotional distress.32  Most jurisdictions 
recognize that a right of privacy, however protected, extends both to what employees do 
                                                 
29 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971) (early advocates for a right of privacy 
emphasized need to protect “private individuals against the unjustifiable infliction of mental pain and 
distress”); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) 
(arguing that common law protects “thoughts, emotions, and sensations” as well as physical integrity and 
property, and therefore that a right of privacy is a logical outgrowth of legal protections against defamation, 
assault, and theft of intellectual property) 
30 See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. App. 1991); CAL. CONST. Art. I, sec. 1.  
The California constitutional right of privacy was added by ballot initiative in 1972, and the ballot 
arguments favoring it explicitly mentioned employment as an area needing legal regulation to protect 
employee privacy.  See Soroka, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at __. 
31 Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992). 
32 The legal protections for a right of privacy in employment are comprehensively discussed in MATTHEW 
W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (2d ed. 2003). 
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 at work (for example, through audio or video recording of the workspace) and what they 
do away from work (for example, social and political activities or affiliations).   
Whatever the source of the privacy right, under most states’ laws, the analysis 
boils down to the same four questions.  First, how serious or offensive is the invasion of 
employee privacy?  Second, does the employee have a subjectively genuine and 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, or expectation of freedom from employer 
control?  Third, does the employer have a legitimate reason for its policy and, if so, how 
compelling is its reason?  Fourth, could the employer serve its legitimate interest through 
some other policy that is less invasive? 
I recognize that in most states privacy rights in the workplace, if they exist at all, 
are quite narrow and weak.  The doctrinal discussion that follows is not intended as an 
argument for why existing doctrine already solidly supports a right of employee 
autonomy in matters of appearance.  Existing doctrine probably does not support such a 
right in the majority of states.  Rather, the discussion that follows is intended as a 
jurisprudential exercise to explore how, if a robust right of privacy did exist in a state, 
such a right could be extended to cover the autonomy right of employees to choose their 
appearance absent some legitimate employer justification.  In such a world, analysis of 
dress codes through a privacy rubric would look something like this.   
First one would consider how significantly the dress code restricts an employee’s 
freedom of choice in dress.  This is the equivalent of asking how seriously or offensively 
a workplace rule intrudes upon an employee’s privacy.  A general requirement of neat 
grooming is generally not a serious intrusion.  The Jespersen regime of a large amount of 
make-up, nail polish of specified colors, and “curled, teased or styled hair” is a 
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 substantial intrusion.33  The system that requires the supervisor to compare an employee’s 
daily appearance to a photograph taken after a make-up artist and hair stylist “made over” 
the employee and, presumably, to berate the employee if her looks on a particular day 
diverge too far from the photo is quite intrusive.  A requirement of wearing a uniform, 
particularly the requirements regarding the minute details of the dress uniform imposed 
by the armed forces, is a substantial intrusion.  A general requirement of wearing a 
conservative suit and tie is a less significant intrusion in most cases, although a particular 
employee from some non-Western culture might find it very intrusive. 
 The second step asks about the employee’s expectation of freedom from intrusion.  
This has both a subjective and an objective element.  The subjective element should 
examine the characteristics of the employee to determine whether the appearance code 
violates some aspect of the employee autonomy that the employee regards as crucial.  A 
Sikh man or a Muslim or Orthodox Jewish woman would regard uncovering their hair as 
a major intrusion, someone who just likes to wear a hat might or might not.  On the other 
hand, the claim does not have to be religious in order to survive:  thus, there would be no 
distinction (unlike under current law) between a woman who wore a headscarf for 
religious reasons and one who wears one for cultural reasons.34  Does the employee 
refuse to wear make-up because of a consistent or profound objection to it, or does she 
                                                 
33 The “Personal Best” grooming policy was exceptionally detailed.  It specified that “[h]air must be teased, 
curled, or styled every day you work.  Hair must be worn down at all times, no exceptions.”  Further, it 
dictated particular quantity, types and colors for make-up:  “Make-up (foundation/concealer and/or face 
powder, as well as blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary colors.”  “Lip 
color must be worn at all times.”  392 F.3d at 1077-78 & nn.1-2. 
34 See Isaacs v. Board of Education, 40 F. Supp.2d 335 (D.Md. 1999) (rejecting the claim of a school girl 
who sought to wear a headwrap of the Caribbean style because her headwrap was neither political speech 
nor religious exercise); United States v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (teacher has no 
right to wear headscarf); Justice Backs Muslim Girl in Headscarf Case, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004 
(U.S. Department of Justice intervened in a suit brought by a Muslim sixth-grader and her family 
challenging ban on headscarves). 
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 just feel too lazy to put it on one day?  Skeptics worry that emphasis on subjective claims 
of harm would empower an employee to claim that wearing a baseball hat, say, is as 
important to him as wearing a headscarf is to a Muslim woman.  I think that fear is 
overblown.  To raise a triable issue of fact (or to convince a jury) on the existence of a 
sincere but subjective claim of injury, the employee would have to offer evidence that he 
always wears a hat and that the baseball hat occupies a place in his life that religious head 
coverings do in the lives of the devout.  There may be some frivolous cases, just as 
people occasionally succeed in making frivolous claims as to whether their religion 
requires particular dress or practice.  But I am not so doubtful of the ability of judges and 
jurors to sort these cases out that I am willing to sacrifice the autonomy rights of the 
nonreligious to dress in the way that is important to them. 
 A different fear about using the right of privacy to challenge workplace 
appearance codes focuses on the ease with which employers can eliminate expectations 
of privacy simply by announcing their intention to intrude upon privacy regularly.  Could 
Harrah’s, for example, defeat Darlene Jespersen’s privacy claim by asserting that in the 
casino industry looks matter and that employees who work in the field should expect 
minute attention to their looks, just as they should expect to be videotaped every moment 
they are on the gambling floor in order to protect the safety and honesty of the operation?  
Here, again, thoughtful analysts of the right of privacy recognize that the law needs to be 
reasonable.  If an employer can defeat any right of privacy simply by announcing its 
intention to allow no privacy, the right is eviscerated, just as the constitutional right of 
privacy could in theory be eviscerated by the government’s announcement that 
henceforward we’ll all have government-monitored cameras in every room of our homes.  
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 The expectation of privacy, most agree, is more than a function of whatever the powers-
that-be will vouchsafe to us at any given moment. 
An additional check on frivolous claims is offered by the requirement that an 
expectation of privacy be objectively as well as subjectively reasonable.  The objective 
element would examine the characteristics of the workplace to try to grasp the 
connotations of an appearance requirement to assess whether the reasonable person 
would find particular appearance regulation an offensive invasion of autonomy.  
Regulation of hair length in the military has different connotations than it does if you 
work at the Gap.  A buzz cut means something different for men than it does for women, 
and would objectively be regarded as humiliating for a woman but not a man.    
 Established law asks, third, about whether the employer has a good reason for its 
requirement.  Here privacy analysis has a real advantage over discrimination analysis 
because it will enable a more thoughtful (or maybe just more middle-of-the-road) 
approach to whether tradition or employer or customer preferences justify a dress code.  
If the offense of the dress code is generally small, then tradition is probably sufficient.  
Thus, if it’s conventional to wear a suit and tie on Wall Street, there is nothing wrong 
with requiring men to wear suits and ties unless the man has some strenuous and good 
objection (such as his religion).  The armed forces might be able to enforce all of their 
uniform requirements, including the picayune ones about which ribbon is worn on which 
part of which coat at which time of day, but not, against an Orthodox Jew, the 
requirement that men have their heads uncovered indoors or at night. 
 The strength of the employer’s justification for its appearance requirements 
mirrors the function of the BFOQ (in the case of expressly discriminatory dress 
Privacy 5   24 3/24/2006 
 requirements) or the business necessity defense (in the case of dress requirements that are 
neutral on their face but have a disparate impact).  Take the example of safety.  A 
requirement that firefighters or airline crew refrain from wearing beards might be 
justifiable if it can be proven that in fact a beard prevents the proper fit of an oxygen 
mask.35   
 Fourth, and finally, privacy analysis asks about whether the employer’s asserted 
reasons for the appearance requirement could be achieved in some less intrusive manner.  
If a uniform is necessary in order to distinguish employees from members of the public, 
as in the case of airline flight attendants, is it really necessary that the uniform be sexy?  
Would it have to require women to wear skirts?  If the symbolism of minute attention to 
every detail of military uniforms is necessary to enable people to read each other’s rank 
at a glance, it may be permissible to regulate to the nth degree where people wear ribbons 
on their uniform.  But that same attention to detail may not necessitate that men refrain 
from wearing head covering.  If that requirement is supported only by tradition, perhaps 
that requirement can give way to a particular employee’s strong religious beliefs without 
jeopardizing the uniform requirement in all its other minute details. 
 An important question to consider is the allocation of the burden of proving the 
various elements.  I propose a divided burden of proof, basing the division on who is 
more likely to have access to the necessary evidence.  Some elements should surely be on 
the employee – the intrusiveness of the regulation, the sincerity and reasonableness of the 
employee’s belief that particular dress habits are expressive of her identity and that the 
employer’s contrary rule compromises her autonomy in a significant way.  Some 
elements should probably be upon the employer, such as the justification for the 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Potter v. District of Columbia, 382 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2005). 
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 appearance requirement and the inability to achieve its goals through a less intrusive 
policy or the inability to make an exception for a particular employee.  For example, even 
if one were prepared to uphold the right of the Air Force to prohibit headgear indoors 
under most circumstances, exactly what was so compelling about the Air Force’s 
requirement that men refrain from wearing head covering that it could not make an 
exception for a rabbi?  Would it really cause every Air Force officer to insist on wearing 
their uniform hats, or baseball hats?    
 The foregoing is just a sketch of how privacy law might approach workplace 
appearance requirements.  It suggests that privacy analysis not only enables sincere and 
compelling claims of autonomy to be respected, not just those that can be identified as 
linked to a particular protected class, but also allows employers to enforce dress codes in 
many cases upon a showing of necessity.  Unlike current law, it would allow racial 
appearance requirements if the employer can prove they’re really necessary (whereas 
currently there is no BFOQ for race), while doing a better job than existing law of forcing 
employers to justify arbitrary and oppressive appearance requirements even when they do 
not discriminate.  Let me now turn to a more systematic comparison of a privacy analysis 
and the dominant antidiscrimination framework, and also consider some likely objections 
to my proposal. 
 
III. Humiliation Versus Discrimination 
A. Discrimination Analysis of Dress Codes and Its Problems 
For the forty years that Title VII has been in force, legal analysis of workplace 
dress codes has focused almost exclusively on whether they discriminate on the basis of 
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 status; gender, race, or religion.  Commentators and history have not been kind to the 
efforts of courts to decide which social norms of dress are legal and which are not.36  All 
of the various approaches that courts have used are either too deferential to employer 
preference, on the one hand, or unable to persuade those who think that some employer-
mandated gender difference in attire ought to be legally permissible.  Under 
antidiscrimination law, a court that believes workplace dress code is acceptable must 
either conclude that it does not discriminate or that the discrimination is justified as a 
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) based on the preferences of the employer or 
the customers.  Neither conclusion seems very appealing to many courts.   
First, the per se approach, which held that any employer-mandated gender 
difference in appearance was sex discrimination, risks undermining the limits on the 
BFOQ defense by allowing stereotypes or employer or customer preference to be enough 
to justify discrimination.37  Most commentators, and many courts outside the appearance 
regulation area, insist that the BFOQ defense should be very narrowly circumscribed in 
order that firms not be allowed to rely on hidden bias, stereotype, or discriminatory 
customer attitudes to justify discriminatory practices.  Thus, in Johnson Controls, the 
leading case on the sex-based BFOQ, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the 
risk of birth defects caused by lead exposure sufficed to justify a rule that prohibited 
fertile women from working in battery production.  The Court insisted that the BFOQ 
defense be construed “narrowly” and be limited to circumstances in which there was 
                                                 
36 See sources cited supra note __.   
37 I owe this typology of different approaches to dress codes to Erica Williamson, whose Note sorted out 
the cases and the dominant critiques of them.  [cite]  
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 evidence that employees of one sex could not do the job as efficiently as employees of 
the other sex.38 
Commentators have remarked on the inescapable role of community norms in 
deciding when adherence to certain gendered appearance requirements is the “essence” of 
a business.39  In an early case involving an older business model of Southwest Airlines, in 
which Southwest advertised itself as the “Love Airline,” marketed the sex appeal of its 
flight attendants to its target clientele of male business travelers, the court rejected the 
contention that the essence of Southwest’s business was selling sex appeal plus safe air 
travel, and insisted instead that safe air travel was the business.40  Who is to say whether 
the essence of Hooters’ business is selling food or selling sex appeal plus food?  Could a 
law firm legally say that the essence of the business is to satisfy client preferences, 
including, as a lawyer in my early career once described a client’s preference for an 
associate who was a “goyisha girl with big charlies”?  If a court believes a discriminatory 
dress code can be upheld as a BFOQ, it is a bit difficult to understand why the preference 
of an employer or its customers for women in make-up or men in neckties should be 
honored whereas the preference of an employer or its customers for only young and 
handsome employees, or only unmarried employees,41 or only non-Muslim employees, or 
                                                 
38 International Union United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991) (BFOQ 
requires that the “employer must direct its concerns about a woman's ability to perform her job safely and 
efficiently to those aspects of the woman's job-related activities that fall within the "essence" of the 
particular business”). 
39 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note __. 
40 In both Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (which involved the “Love 
Airline” marketing campaign), and Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 
1971) (in which Pan Am justified its refusal to hire male flight attendants with expert psychiatric testimony 
that the special psychological needs of passengers in an airplane are better attended to by females), the 
courts rejected the contention that the essence of the airline business is selling comfort or sex appeal rather 
than merely safe air travel. 
41 See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (describing the range of litigation 
challenging sex discrimination by airlines in hiring flight attendants); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 
F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (declaring the airlines’ no-marriage rule for female flight attendants unlawful). 
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 only men and infertile women in battery production facility,42 should not be honored.  
The alternative to allowing biased employer or customer preferences to govern is to 
prohibit any appearance regulation that was not entirely androgynous.   
An alternative to the per se rule, with its inevitable struggles over the scope of the 
BFOQ, is the mutability analysis, which held that appearance codes are permissible 
because they do not discriminate based on immutable characteristics (race, sex, or 
national origin).  The mutability analysis is vulnerable to the argument that Title VII 
prohibits discrimination on mutable traits (religion) and trait-plus discrimination even 
when the “plus” is entirely mutable (employer discrimination against women who are 
married43 or who have small children44 is illegal, though both of those traits are mutable).  
The variation on the mutability rule, that Title VII prohibits discrimination only based on 
immutable traits plus fundamental rights (which would protect religion and family status) 
still is vulnerable:  an employer that hired men only if they can play tennis without 
applying the same requirement to women, or that refused to hire women but not men who 
bowl, would violate Title VII even though playing tennis and bowling are not generally 
regarded as fundamental rights.45   
A third approach to discriminatory dress codes is the one employed most recently 
in Jespersen:  the unequal burdens analysis, which allows appearance codes that equally 
                                                 
42 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187. 
43 Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198. 
44 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)(per curiam). 
45 See id. at 543 (holding that discrimination on the basis of sex plus another trait is illegal).  While some 
commentators have noted that some of the cases challenging appearance codes have remarked that sex-plus 
discrimination is unlawful only if the trait is immutable or a fundamental right, see Yuracko, Trait 
Discrimination, supra note __ at 205 & nn.145-47 (collecting citations), there are other cases, including 
Price Waterhouse, in which courts have found trait discrimination to be illegal even when the sex-plus trait 
is not immutable.  I have a hard time believing that a court would uphold an employment rule prohibiting 
women but not men from bowling if any employer were silly enough to enforce one.  
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 burden men and women or other comparison groups.46  Its principal flaw is that it invites 
silly and utterly subjective comparisons:  Is wearing a necktie more or less burdensome 
than wearing panty hose?  Does it matter whether it is winter or summer?  Is shaving 
one’s face more or less burdensome than applying make-up and nail polish?  What should 
a court do about the claim of a particular man who especially loathes a discriminatory 
appearance requirement (like shaving or putting on make-up) if most say they don’t 
particularly mind it? 
 The conceptual failings of the dominant forms of discrimination analysis as 
applied to dress codes go deeper than the overbreadth or underinclusiveness of the 
existing rules.  The notion that gendered or ethnic dress codes are illegal only because 
they discriminate is, in some cases, artificial.   It fails to capture many of the reasons why 
employees object to particular appearance regulation.  Men in the 1960s did not grow 
their hair long in order to look like women, and the offense of making them cut their hair 
was not that they were not allowed to wear their hair like women but that they were not 
allowed to express the non-gendered message that long hair connoted.  Men who wear 
long hair aren’t necessarily (or even usually) gender-bending: long hair symbolizes other 
things – in the 1960s it signified rebellion against power, convention, and the older 
generation; it can signify authentic Native American identity; it can signify earthiness.47  
                                                 
46 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076 (2004), reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 
(2005). 
47 I am reminded of the Crosby, Stills Nash (& Young) song, “Almost Cut My Hair,” which celebrates long 
hair as a badge of independence: 
 
Almost cut my hair 
It happened just the other day 
It’s gettin’ kind of long 
I could’ve said it was in my way 
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 The make-up requirement to which Darlene Jespersen objected is more obviously a case 
of gender discrimination in that wearing make-up is clearly about feminine sexuality.  
But even women who are happy to wear make-up when they choose might be offended 
by being forced to wear a certain quantity and to have their compliance checked. 
The essentialism of discrimination analysis is its reliance on the idea certain 
appearance conventions are “white” or “black” or “male” or whatever.  Some whites and 
some blacks can wear their hair in an Afro, some of both races cannot.  When a court 
rejected the claim of a black flight attendant who was fired for wearing her hair in 
cornrows by pointing out that the hair style wasn’t “black” because Bo Derek popularized 
braids in the movie “10,” the court refused to acknowledge that for that flight attendant, 
wearing her hair in cornrows was an important expression of her racial identity, whereas 
the same hairstyle on a white woman may connote something entirely different.48 
 B. The Advantages of Privacy Analysis 
There are several advantages, both practical and doctrinal, for re-examining 
workplace dress codes in terms of autonomy-privacy.   The advantages fall into two 
categories.  First, privacy analysis does a better job than discrimination analysis of 
balancing competing employer and employee interests by calibrating the strength of the 
employer interest in regulating appearance to the degree of autonomy infringement that 
regulation causes.  Second, privacy is a right that all enjoy, thus the legal protection is 
extended to every person because of their individuality, not only to members of those 
                                                                                                                                                 
But I didn’t and I wonder why 
I feel like letting my freak flag fly 
… 
 
48 Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair 
Piece:  Pespectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L. J. 365. 
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 groups who are protected by antidiscrimination law and who can convince a court that a 
dress code treats some groups better than others. 
  1. Calibration and Nuance 
A legal strategy that focused on discrimination was always vulnerable to the fears 
of the extreme argument.  To take the argument to its logical conclusion, skeptics 
routinely claimed, would prohibit employers from requiring employees to adhere to 
conventions for professional dress (men must wear suits and ties; women can and 
sometimes must wear suits but not neckties).  It would, skeptics insisted, either compel an 
employer to employ a drag queen in a customer service position or to require all 
employees to dress entirely androgynously so that women would be prohibited from 
wearing long hair, make-up, dresses, or high heels if they choose.  Both contentions are 
often taken as argument-stoppers.  Once you concede, as Katharine Bartlett did and I do, 
that Title VII should allow some dress codes that reflect community norms while 
rejecting others, you have a tough time deciding which norms the law can and should 
change or reject and which it should accept.49  Privacy analysis helps, for it reminds 
courts and employers that all of us have to conform to some norms of appearance some of 
the time, but that no one should be required to conform to every norm all the time 
regardless of the harm inflicted or the strength of the justification. 
The doctrinal structure of privacy law invites flexibility and nuance in the 
examination of the degree to which the policy is offensive (both across the board and as 
applied to particular employees), the strength of the justification for a policy that does 
invade privacy, and the question whether there are other ways that the employer could 
                                                 
49 Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes:  Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, 
and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994). 
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 achieve its legitimate goals with a lesser infringement on the employee’s autonomy.  
Antidiscrimination law, by contrast, makes almost no effort to examine the offensiveness 
of a policy and tends to do a poor job at allowing nuance in the question of justification 
and fit because of the concern that accepting too many things as a BFOQ will eviscerate 
the prohibitions against discrimination.  
Moreover, privacy law explicitly incorporates an analysis of justification and 
narrow tailoring that antidiscrimination law does only in part.  When it comes to race, 
because there is no BFOQ for race in Title VII, in theory there is no justification, no 
matter how compelling, for an employer to discriminate.50  As to other protected traits, 
courts have tried (outside the context of appearance codes and Hooters) to limit the 
circumstances in which employer or customer preference counts as a BFOQ to a set of 
narrow special categories.  When the justification is asserted for a form of disparate 
impact discrimination, as in the case of the duty to accommodate religion, the law is far 
more forgiving of an employer’s choices that disparately burden people of one religion 
over another.  Neither in the case of BFOQ nor business necessity have courts been as 
thoughtful as one might like about tying the degree of harm to the strength of justification 
to the fit between the justification and the policy that inflicts the harm.  Privacy analysis, 
at its best, insists that courts and lawyers think critically at all three steps.    
2. Privacy for All 
One is that privacy doctrine is the one place in employment law where courts 
have recognized that there are boundaries to the employer’s ability to regulate the 
                                                 
50 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e).  Many think there is an unwritten BFOQ for race (police departments use race in 
assigning undercover cops, movie makers use race in casting, and law firms use race in assigning lawyers 
to handle a race-sensitive trial).  See Paul Frymer & John D. Skretny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative 
Action:  Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 680 (2004).  
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 workplace in ways that impinge on the employee’s sense or expression of self.  Rather 
than focusing on equal as opposed to special treatment (is it equality or discrimination to 
require all cadets at the Citadel to shave their heads or all Air Force officers to wear no 
head covering at certain times?) privacy focuses on the right of employees to have a 
sphere, whether it is the contents of their desk, the content of their thoughts, the contents 
of their weekend calendar, or the style of their hair that is free from employer control 
absent a strong justification. 
Second, privacy helps address the conventional complaint that only “favored” 
groups are protected by the law.  As Kenji Yoshino has pointed out, everyone has to do 
some things regarding their appearance that they don’t like – what he calls “covering” – 
in order to put on the façade that is expected in different work settings.51    While it is true 
that WASP men are protected under Title VII too, and thus on the right facts a white man 
could sue to challenge appearance regulation, there is a widespread perception among 
whites that people of color, religious minorities, and women have greater workplace 
protections because they get to choose whether to acquiesce in a gender- or race-
stereotyped dress code or whether to fight it.  A privacy theory is available to any 
employee who can convince a court that some aspect of a dress code is offensive to their 
authentic self. 
Third, privacy law moves the focus away from antidiscrimination law’s emphasis 
on group membership, immutable traits, and group exercise of fundamental rights and 
toward the ways in which appearance regulation can harm people because of their 
individuality rather than their group membership.  By putting the focus on autonomy and 
the limits on self-expression at work, the law would extend to all employees a right to 
                                                 
51 KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING (2006). 
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 legal protection for authentic expression as each person feels it.  Moreover, privacy 
analysis would turn the old antidiscrimination analysis (forced lawyers to argue for the 
immutability of identity) on its head.  It is the mutability of appearance and the choices 
that each person makes about how to express themselves through their appearance that 
make workplace dress worthy of legal protection. 
Not only does a privacy analysis avoid the fearsome specter of the man 
“minc[ing] around in high heels,”52 it also captures an element of dress regulation that is 
missing from the conventional analysis.  Considering appearance regulations from the 
standpoint of antidiscrimination law misses a fundamental part of why employers impose 
them, why employees find them objectionable, and why the law should restrict it.  
Moreover, prohibiting only those applications of dress codes that discriminate on the 
basis of a protected status leaves vulnerable those employees who either do not find or 
cannot prove that their objection to a dress code is based on a protected identity 
characteristic.  Conceiving them as invasions of the autonomy that the right of privacy 
protects, however, catches more of the nuance about when and why they should be 
prohibited. 
C. Anticipating Objections   
Let me now address a number of the objections one might make to my proposal.  
First, there is the obvious but facile criticism that a right of privacy seems a poor choice 
for protecting something that is as quintessentially public as the public face we set for the 
world.  A right of privacy is a misnomer, at least in some of its applications in both an 
                                                 
52 Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring)  
(complaining that case law on sex stereotyping “has gone off the tracks” in reasoning “as if there were a 
federally protected right for male workers to wear nail polish and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince 
about in high heels, or for female ditchdiggers to strip to the waist in hot weather”) 
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 employment relationship and more obviously in constitutional discourse.  It protects all 
sorts of behavior that is not necessarily hidden from view; it protects a boundary between 
the self and the world, or between one’s personal life and one’s work life.  As many have 
observed, privacy should be about autonomy, rather than secrecy.  Some versions of the 
common law right of privacy protect public information (like a photograph of your face) 
when the harm to your dignity or autonomy comes not from revelation of private 
information but from falsely associating your identity with a product or portraying you in 
a false light.53 
A more serious objection is that the employee’s autonomy right collides with the 
employer’s autonomy right to put its face before the world through the faces of its 
employees.  This is a point elegantly raised by Robert Post in his work on appearance and 
discrimination, Prejudicial Appearances, when he commented on an ordinance that was 
proposed (but not ultimately enacted in its most vigorous form) that would have 
prevented employers from discriminating based on employee appearance.54  An advocate 
of the ordinance described the discrimination she experienced because employers felt 
threatened by a woman with a shaved head, save for a single patch of bright pink hair, 
and a stripe tattooed on her face.  Post observed some inconsistency between the 
woman’s awareness and embrace of the shock conveyed by her appearance and her belief 
that she should be free from adverse employment action because of the reactions her 
looks elicit.  He remarked on “the seemingly paradoxical notion that persons have the 
right both to use their appearance to communicate meanings, including messages of 
                                                 
53 PROSSER, supra note __ at 804-807 (discussing the appropriation, for defendant’s benefit, of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness), 812-814 (discussing false light privacy). 
54 Post, Prejudicial Appearances, supra note __; ROBERT C. POST, K. ANTHONY APPIAH, JUDITH BUTLER, 
THOMAS C. GREY & REVA B. SIEGEL, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES:  THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
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 ‘threat,’ and simultaneously expect others to ignore these messages.”55  A resolution of 
the paradox, if there is a paradox, can be reached if we use law to force people to 
confront exactly what meaning is conveyed by a sales clerk with a shaved head, a lawyer 
with blue hair, or a cross-dressing insurance agent.   
There are two parts to the analysis.  First, there is the idea that firms have a right 
to express themselves through their employee’s appearance.  The heart of the opposition 
to appearance regulation is the idea that it deprives the employer of its autonomy right to 
to express itself through the faces of the people it hires.  I question whether employers, 
even when they are individuals, and even when the job in question has an important 
component of conveying certain values, have a right to express themselves through their 
employees regardless of the message.  Take the extreme case of employer autonomy:  
where I am hiring a nanny to care for my children.  Why should I be able to require her to 
wear a uniform, if the message conveyed by domestic staff wearing a uniform is one of 
subordination (as I think it is)?  Why should the owner of a spa be able to require “badly 
coiffed employees” to get their hair cut?56  What message is conveyed by an employee of 
a spa having a hair cut that the spa owner doesn’t like?   
Whatever the force of the employer autonomy argument when the employer is an 
individual or a small business, when the business can be seen to express the individuality 
of the person who owns it, I question whether a corporation has a similar right.  Courts 
have been reluctant to extend to corporations the same panoply of associational and 
expressive rights that individuals enjoy, recognizing that the expression of corporate 
expression or association rights comes at the expense of employees’ rights to be free from 
                                                 
55 POST, supra note __ at 7. 
56 Beauty Bullies, supra note __ at 130. 
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 discrimination.57  Whose expression are we protecting?  The managers, executives, or 
stockholders of corporations?  In what sense do the shareholders of Harrah’s casinos 
express themselves through the bartender in Reno?  The argument usually gains traction 
only when it is taken to an extreme in one direction or another.  A fashion industry 
executive who suggested an employee get a pedicure before wearing a pair of sandals to 
an industry gala would defend her position by saying that in her industry people are 
judged on their looks, and that even a single employee whose feet might prompt someone 
else in the industry to think the employee was unattractive could somehow adversely 
affect the reputation of the firm.58   
Even if you assert that corporations should have a right of expression in this 
context, as they have a right to engage in first amendment speech,59 one might still 
question whether a corporation’s right to express itself through employee appearance that 
is sufficiently compelling to trump an employee’s right to express herself.  In the first 
amendment context, the expressive interests of associations is generally limited to those 
associations (whose ranks may have grown after the Supreme Court upheld the right of 
the Boy Scouts to express a homophobic message by the exclusion of gays) that can 
credibly claim to be sufficiently private and sufficiently devoted to expression that it 
would violate the rights of the members to join together with those who share their views 
and to exclude those who do not.  It is a huge leap to move from a private organization’s 
expressive interests in excluding gays to the right of large corporations to express 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (Jaycees organization has no right to 
exclude women from membership); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (Boy Scouts have 
expressive right to exclude gays). 
58 Beauty Bullies, supra note __ at 130. 
59 See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (statute that prohibits corporations from expending 
funds to influence the vote on ballot measures violates the first amendment). 
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 themselves in their hiring decisions; if you make that move, of course, all of 
contemporary antidiscrimination law is constitutionally suspect.60 
Second, even if you accept the notion that firms have some legally protectable 
right to express themselves through their employees’ appearance, you have to ask what 
message is conveyed by a firm that employs a person with unconventional or shocking 
(to some) appearance?  Consider tattoos and headscarves as examples.   
Tattoos.  The meaning of tattoos appears to be undergoing a significant transition 
in the contemporary U.S.  Once considered the favored adornment of sailors of the lowest 
rank, and later regarded the insignia of renegade motorcyclists and gang members, tattoos 
are now said to be widely accepted among the younger generation.  A 2003 Harris online 
interactive poll, as reported in a Nevada newspaper, found that thirty-six percent of 
people between the ages of 25 and 29 have at least one tattoo, as compared to a quarter of 
those in their 30s.61  The news article portrayed the perception of tattoos as being very 
generationally specific:  younger people think nothing of them; older people find them 
slovenly, repulsive, or even intimidating.  If the justification for allowing employers to 
prohibit tattoos is customer reaction (though it is not always that; some even argue that 
employers can inquire about and refuse to hire based on tattoos that are not visible when 
the employee is clothed62), what weight should we give to the possibility that the 
employer is misjudging customer reaction?  The growing popularity of tattoos suggests 
that their meaning is changing.  The employer’s message in banning them may be 
muddier than it once was, which should reduce the weight of whatever interest the 
                                                 
60 Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interests of Associations, 9 WILLIAM & MARY 
BILL OF RIGHTS J. 595 (2001). 
61 Tattoos in Business, supra note __. 
62 Id. 
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 employer has in regulating that aspect of employee self-expression.  If tattoos are no 
longer a reliable predictor of a bad attitude toward authority or toward work, it is hard to 
imagine any legitimate employer interest in refusing to hire employees with tattoos that 
are not visible while the employee is clothed. 
Headscarves.  The furor over French legislation banning headscarves in schools 
raised the question whether the ban was about preserving a secular society, protecting 
girls against repressive religious demands, or repressing Muslim identity.  A careful 
student of the debate over the legislation could find a mix of these motives in the ban.63  
The wearing of the headscarf itself could reflect the wearer’s attempt to convey one or 
more of multiple messages, including religious piety, gender subordination, or ethnic 
pride.  You could see in the Muslim women who insist on headscarves a desire to 
embrace an ethnic heritage or pride that becomes all the more fierce as they perceive a 
rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment among non-Muslim French.  You could see a 
desire to find the comfort of ethnic identity as an antidote to the alienation and anomie of 
persistent poverty in the grim housing projects outside Paris.  And of course the 
interpretation of the headscarf by viewers could vary as well.  What some French may 
once have deemed a relatively innocuous or charming ethnic or religious tradition might 
now be regarded as an endorsement of separatism, chauvinism, or even anti-European 
violence.  In short, you cannot understand the multiple messages both implied by women 
who wear headscarves and inferred by people who view them without understanding the 
social and political context of the Muslim and African immigrant population in France. 
                                                 
63 John Valery White, Globalism and the American Civil Rights Model:  Toward an Assimilation Law 
(publication forthcoming in the proceedings of the XVII Colloquio Biennale, AIDC) (manuscript on file 
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 But the fact that you need to understand the context of group identity in order to 
grasp the multiple meanings of certain habits of dress does not mean that they would 
become unintelligible if we supplemented the dominant antidiscrimination analysis with a 
privacy analysis.  My point, rather, is that we’ll need some understanding of the group-
based identity formation that people engage in when they make choices about their 
appearance in order to understand why some appearance regulations are permissible and 
others are not.  The messages conveyed by habits of dress and personal adornment are 
varied, extremely context specific, and change rapidly.  The wearer, the employer, and 
the customer may be conveying and receiving quite different messages.  Awareness of 
the group-based identity formation that dress performs, an awareness of the equality 
issues implicated in appearance regulation strengthens rather than weakens the claim for 
privacy protection.  In particular, given the muddiness in the signal, but the undeniable 
hardship on an employee who is fired or not hired because of her appearance, it seems to 
me that the employer’s argument for self-expression through employees’ bodies is 
weaker than the employees’ arguments. 
 Another objection to my proposal goes to the question whether, if we divorce the 
legal analysis of appearance regulation from antidiscrimination analysis, we will lose our 
understanding of why appearance regulation matters.  Every observer of appearance 
regulation, at least since Erving Goffman’s influential (and newly resurgent) book 
Stigma, has noted that appearances are meaningful because they enable both the viewer 
and the viewed establish a social identity by association with a category.  Today’s 
favorite citation for that same observation is Malcolm Gladwell’s bestselling work, Blink, 
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 which documents the importance of snap judgments formed on first impressions.64  That 
is, appearances identify us as members of a group, and they are meaningful only in the 
context of particular cultures.  A headscarf can be religious (on a nun or a Muslim 
woman), ethnic (on a person expressing Caribbean identity or heritage), or glamorous (on 
a Hollywood movie star riding in a convertible in the 1950s).  Lots of gold jewelry can be 
“ghetto fabulous” on a black person,65 or a traditional display of wealth and status in 
India, or glamorous on the wife of a Texas oil magnate shopping in Beverly Hills, or 
trashy among certain New England old money sorts who disdain conspicuous displays of 
wealth.  The importance of appearance as an expression of self is meaningful only in the 
context in which appearance says something about you (or at least you think it does), and 
that has necessarily something to do with group identity. 
 I think that reconceiving workplace appearance regulation in terms of privacy will 
not sacrifice the group identity based understanding of why appearances matter and why 
protecting employees’ rights to choose appearance is important in the ongoing project of 
eliminating racial, gender, and other forms of subordination.  It will strengthen the project 
by forcing us to recognize that appearance rules that do not discriminate on the basis of a 
protected class (like tattoos or green hair) nevertheless subordinate an out group and do 
so in a way that is often unjustified by business necessity and based largely on ill-
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 considered stereotype.  It turns out, as a Nevada employer remarked, that “[y]ounger 
folks are into body art, and have a good work ethic.”66   
Conclusion 
I have argued that we should reconceive the legality of workplace dress codes in 
terms of the universal protections for liberty and autonomy that are protected by the right 
of privacy rather than, as we have done, through group-based equality doctrine.  My 
proposal does not require a break with past law but rather simply a shift in emphasis.  
That is, using the formulation of Carbado, Gulati, and Ramachandran, that appearance 
requirements are “a kind of forced assimilation into gender normative behavior,” I simply 
suggest we focus more than we have on the forced assimilation part as opposed to the 
gender normativity part. 
A casual reader of the legal literature on appearance regulation might come away 
with the vague impression either that people who write on the topic are especially literary 
in their tastes or that there is some deep connection between novels and the law of 
appearances.  The truth of the matter is that novelists have, because of the constraints of 
their task, learned something that lawyers have not:  appearances matter because of what 
they reveal about interiors.  A lawyer or judge arguing that workplace appearance 
regulation is inoffensive or trivial operates from that old notion (especially popular with 
parents trying to console an adolescent insecure about his or her looks or to counsel 
someone making an unwise choice in love) that looks are only skin deep.  A novelist 
would never say that; the description of a character’s appearance in a novels is rarely just 
about the surface; it is about revelation of a character’s personality, history, motivations, 
and future. 
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So too in life.  The way people choose to dress and other aspects of their 
appearance are deliberate choices for most people.  Those who dress to blend into a Wall 
Street culture do so because that’s how they see themselves in the world, or feel 
themselves in the world.  Those who choose to dye their hair green do so because they 
want to be noticed by those without green hair (and to blend in among the green hair 
crowd).  The way we choose to dress, and it is always an ongoing process of choice, is 
part of everyone’s process of self-definition.  Whatever someone’s choice, to require him 
or her to dress in a way that feels fundamentally contrary to his or her preferences is to 
ask him or her to project an inauthentic self.  Regardless of whether you can identify your 
self-definition with a group currently protected under antidiscrimination law, the right to 
define your self is at the very core of what the right of privacy should protect. 
 
